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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 16-3658 
_______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MICHELLE C. CANTATORE, 
       Appellant 
___ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey  
No. 2-16-cr-00189-1 
District Judge:  The Honorable Esther Salas 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 9, 2017 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, VANASKIE, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: August 25, 2017) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
Michelle Cantatore challenges her 162-month sentence in a bank robbery and wire 
fraud case. Her counsel has filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 
                                                          
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing that Cantatore’s appeal raises no issues of arguable merit. 
For the following reasons, we will grant counsel’s motion and affirm the order of the 
District Court. 
 I.  
On April 13, 2016, Cantatore entered a guilty plea to a two-count Information, 
charging her with bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and 2 and wire fraud 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and 2. Cantatore admitted that she used a paintball gun 
made to look like a real gun to rob three banks insured by the FDIC of almost $300,000 
and engaged in a scheme to defraud a victim of almost $200,000.  
A sentencing hearing was held on September 7, 2016. Based on a total offense 
level of 28 and a criminal history category of V, Cantatore was subject to a Guidelines 
range of 130-162 months.1 Although the District Court initially indicated it was 
considering an upward variance, it imposed a sentence of 162 months, at the top of the 
Guidelines range. 
Cantatore timely filed a notice of appeal, and her counsel filed an Anders motion 
to withdraw. Cantatore was given the opportunity to file a pro se brief, but did not do so. 
The Government submitted a brief in support of counsel’s Anders motion. 
II.2 
                                                          
1 Though the plea agreement did not stipulate to a Guidelines’ range, the Government and 
Cantatore’s counsel both agreed to this Guidelines calculation. The Government did not 
seek an upward variance, and Cantatore’s counsel did not seek a downward variance. 
2 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  
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Our review3 is twofold—we will consider whether counsel’s brief fulfills the 
Anders requirements and whether our own independent review of the record reveals any 
nonfrivolous issues for appeal.4 “The duties of counsel when preparing an Anders brief 
are (1) to satisfy the court that counsel has thoroughly examined the record in search of 
appealable issues, and (2) to explain why the issues are frivolous.”5 Our review need not 
be “a complete scouring of the record”— “[w]here the Anders brief initially appears 
adequate on its face, the proper course is for the appellate court to be guided in reviewing 
the record by the Anders brief itself.”6 “An appeal on a matter of law is frivolous where 
none of the legal points is arguable on [its] merits.”7 
The Anders brief identifies three potential issues for appeal:8 (1) whether the 
District Court had jurisdiction; (2) whether Cantatore’s guilty plea hearing was properly 
conducted; and (3) whether the sentence imposed was procedurally and substantively 
reasonable.9 Cantatore’s counsel has fulfilled his Anders duties, and satisfies us that there 
are no issues of arguable merit.  
                                                          
3 Our review is governed by Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and 3d Cir. 
L.A.R. 109.2. 
4 United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 301 (internal citations and quotations removed). 
7 Simon v. Gov’t of V.I., 679 F.3d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 2012). 
8 While Cantatore’s counsel mentions a waiver of appeal, the Government finds no 
appellate waiver as to the ultimate sentence and does not assert such waiver. Gov’t Br. 3 
n.1.  
9 Cantatore’s counsel hints at, and the Government addresses, a possible fourth issue for 
appeal: ineffective assistance of counsel, because Cantatore’s counsel agreed to the 
Guidelines range and did not seek a downward departure or variance. This basis is also 
frivolous. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are generally not cognizable on direct 
appeal. Gov’t of V.I. v. Vanterpool, 767 F.3d 157, 163 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. 
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First, the District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C § 3231, as Cantatore was 
charged with “offenses against the laws of the United States.” Thus, the Anders brief 
correctly notes that any jurisdictional challenge would be frivolous.  
Second, Cantatores’s guilty plea hearing was properly conducted and complied 
with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.10 The transcript of the plea hearing 
demonstrates Cantatore’s plea was knowing and voluntary.11 The District Court 
explained, and Cantatore acknowledged that she understood, (1) she was forfeiting her 
rights to a jury trial and to challenge the evidence against her, (2) the nature of the 
charges to which she pleaded, (3) the maximum penalties she was facing,12 (4) the 
Court’s obligation to consider the sentencing Guidelines and its discretion to depart from 
                                                          
Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 464 (3d Cir. 2003). Furthermore, as the Government points out, 
Cantatore’s counsel “successfully convinced the District Court to impose a within-
Guidelines sentence, despite its ‘tremendous desire . . . to upwardly vary.’” Gov’t Br. 6 
n.2 (quoting App. 114; App. 69 (explaining that sentencing counsel would be successful 
if she could “manag[e] to convince me not to exercise my discretion and go upward in 
this case”)). Thus, “[a] request for a downward variance would have been particularly 
tone-deaf and would not have been successful.” Id. (citing United States v. Sanders, 165 
F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 1999) (counsel cannot be ineffective for not making a meritless 
argument)). 
10 Rule 11 “outlines a series of admonitions and warnings to be provided to the 
defendant,” United States v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2006), and provides 
steps a District Court must take to ensure a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary. United 
States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58 (2002). “The district court must ensure that the defendant 
receives these caveats, understands them, and still wishes of his or her own volition to 
plead guilty.” Schweitzer, 454 F.3d at 203.  
11 See Anders Br. 10-12. 
12 The Government acknowledges it may have been error for the District Court to rely on 
the Government’s recitation of the maximum penalty, but also correctly points out that 
later in the hearing, the Court repeated this information to Cantatore. See Gov’t Br. 9 n.5; 
App. 42 (Government recites maximum penalties); App. 50 (Court acknowledges 
maximum penalties). 
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those Guidelines, and (5) the Government’s recitation of the facts and the criminal 
conduct she was admitting.13 Thus, Cantatore’s guilty plea complied with Rule 11, and an 
appeal on this basis would be frivolous. 
Finally, the District Court’s within-guidelines sentence of 162 months was 
procedurally and substantively reasonable.14 The sentencing Guidelines range was 
correctly calculated and the Court meaningfully considered the sentencing factors 
enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The Court considered Cantatore’s arguments in 
mitigation and justified its decision to sentence at the top of the range.15 Consequently, an 
appeal on this basis would be meritless. 
III. 
Counsel’s brief satisfies the requirements of Anders, and properly finds there is no 
reasonable basis on which Cantatore can appeal. Accordingly, we will grant counsel’s 
motion to withdraw and affirm the order of the District Court.16 
                                                          
13 App. 26-64. 
14 We review sentences for abuse of discretion. United States v. Grober, 624 F.3d 592, 
599 (3d Cir. 2010).  
15 The Court considered factors including Cantatore’s childhood and difficult life 
experiences, mental condition, addictions, long criminal history, her use of a modified 
weapon, and the trauma sustained by her bank teller victims. 
16 Cantatore is hereby advised that under the Criminal Justice Act, counsel is not 
obligated to file a petition for rehearing in this Court or a petition for writ of certiorari in 
the United States Supreme Court. See also L.A.R. 35.4; 109.2(b). If Cantatore wishes to 
pursue these avenues, she must do so pro se. Cantatore should note that a petition for 
rehearing en banc must be filed within 14 days of the entry of judgment; if that time has 
passed, Cantatore may promptly file a motion to enlarge the time for such filing. Counsel 
shall timely send a copy of this Opinion to Cantatore. 
 
